Finally, academic debate on democratization in recent years has centered on the question of "civil society," What constitutes civil society? Where does it come from? And what impact does it have on democratic transitions? These are the major questions that have been raised in this debate. A vibrant civil society is thought by many scholars to be the single greatest determinant not only of democratic transition, but of sustainable democracy, as well.9
The purpose of this necessarily brief overview of the democracy debate is to suggest that virtually all scholars agree that some form of transition in society-economic or socio-cultural-is a necessary (if not always sufficient) condition for democratic transition. There is a consensus that states themselves are not the progenitors of democracy but, rather, that they respond to changes in society. Both empirically and logically, this makes a good deal of sense. It is true that some recent works have concentrated on the art of making a democratic pact between state actors and societal actors (and the sorts of combinations of "hard-liner" and "soft-liner" actors that spur or inhibit democratization).10 Even in these works on democratic "crafting," however, some societal crisis or transformation has pushed the state into accepting the need for democratic transition in order to "spread the blame."
The small handful of scholarly works that take seriously state crisis as the primary mover behind democratization invariably invoke the loss of cohesion among state elites as the point of departure. In these works, factions of the state elite lose confidence in the prevailing order and seek to re-legitimate their positions through democratization. The origins of such elite conflict-or "fissures in the power bloc," as Adam Przeworski puts it1 1-are often left unexplained. Defensive democratization, conversely, need not involve elite conflict, and in the case of Jordan, it did not. In this case, there were no fissures in the power bloc, as state elites remained cohesive throughout.
The concept of defensive democratization departs from the themes noted earlier in that it posits that a state seeks to pre-empt anticipated pressure for political reform in the face of a crisis in the state, not society. That crisis is normally fiscal in content, as is the case in Jordan. Defensive democratization can take place in the absence of class restructuring, economic growth (or growth and decline), a vibrant civil society, or any other societal phenomena. Defensive democratization, even in the absence of democratizing social pressure, is a state strategy to maintain the dominant political order in the face of severe state fiscal crisis. Such fiscal crises, particularly in rentier states, are only loosely related to general economic problems in a country.
Defensive democratization played out in Jordan, briefly, as follows. Jordan, as is common in the Arab world, was a "rentier" or "distributive" state in that it relied on international rents instead of direct taxation for a disproportionate share of its government revenues.12 Most of Jordan's rents came from direct state-to-state transfers, particularly from Arab oil countries. These rents dried up in the 1980s, leading to a severe budgetary crisis in the Jordanian state.13 Jordan then secretly turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ease its fiscal crisis, but had to cut public expenditures-subsidies-as part of the deal. The resulting unrest in 1989 prompted King Hussein to adopt a policy of defensive democratization: to return Jordan to limited parliamentary life in order to pre-empt potentially more severe threats to the ruling order. State-driven defensive democratization preserved the basic (although somewhat reshuffled) structure of power in Jordan, which might otherwise be threatened by society-driven substantive reform.14 Defensive democratization is not without risk for the ruling elite. It is quite possible that sustained top-down and limited democratization may gather a life of its own, leading to a snowballing of democratic demands. It is a process that may not be controllable forever by the elite. However, rentier states are better situated to resist demands for significant democratic expansion if the fiscal crisis is limited in scope and time. Societal depolitization is a hallmark of rentier states. Conversely, if a rentier state is compelled by budgetary realities to permanently extract greater resources from its own society (i.e., through taxation), then demands for greater inclusion and substantive political restructuring would be difficult to resist.
The most important reason that snowballing has not occurred thus far in Jordan is that the business community has benefited from the limited nature of the democratization campaign. The reticence of business to embrace a more extensive democratic transition is easily understood: the private sector-dominated by the Palestinian community-has benefited the most from IMF structural adjustment in Jordan. The private sector needs the protection of the state to prevent East Bank retaliation in the form of re-distributing resources toward the East Bank-dominated public sector. In this case, ethnic and public/private sector cleavages reinforce each other, leading the business community to champion economic, but not political, liberalization. The "exit option" for business to split with the state and embrace substantive democratization is structurally limited as a result.15 While the particular circumstances in Jordan are unique, this mutually beneficial relationship between rentier states and their respective business communities appears to be quite common, explaining in part the lack of significant democratization in most such cases.
THE ORIGINS OF JORDAN'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM
By almost any measure, Jordan's economic fortunes were in decline well before the beginning of the Gulf War in 1990.16 Its per capita GNP, hovering around $2,000 since 1985, plummeted to less than $1,500 in 1989. Similarly, remittances from Jordanians working abroad, primarily in the Gulf, dropped sharply, from more than $1 billion annually before 1987 to $623 million in 1989. The Gulf War forced remittances lower: to $500 million in 1990 and $450 million in 1991.17 During this same period, Jordan was running constant deficits in trade and current accounts, and had declining real earnings. More important (at least to the argument contained here), government transfers, primarily from Gulf Arab countries, declined markedly, leading to constant budget deficits during this period.18 From 1980 to 1989, Jordan received annually from $550 million to $1.3 billion in official transfers. In 1990, that figure dropped to $393 million. By 1991, it was down to $164 million. In fact, in 1990 Jordan had to reschedule its large external debt because pledges of Gulf financial support had not been kept.19 In short, in the late 1980s, Jordan was faced with a severe and destabilizing debt crisis, which would only get worse in the years that followed.
In response to this ongoing and severe fiscal crisis, the government entered into an initially secret structural-adjustment agreement with the IMF at the end of 1988. In return for IMF loans, Jordan had to undertake a series of economic reforms, including cuts in government spending (primarily subsidies) and increases in government revenues-that is, tax hikes. Subsidies and other types of welfare payments had long been staples of Hashemite patronage to important constituencies, primarily in the southern (non-Palestinian) half of the country. By cutting these subsidies, and thereby indirectly attacking key bases of its support, the monarchy put its very survival in jeopardy. The public announcement of the IMF agreement, which included sharp increases in the prices of a number of basic commodities, led to bloody riots in the south, initially centered on Macan, in April 1989. The riots and ensuing clashes between two cornerstones of Hashemite rule-the East Bank-dominated military and southern East Bank and Bedouin citizens-shook the regime. Unlike in 1970, Palestinians were not central players in the unrest. Responding to the most serious challenge to his rule in nearly twenty years, King Hussein called for parliamentary elections to be held before the end of the year. General parliamentary elections had not been held in Jordan since before the 1967 war.
At one level, Jordan's decision to liberalize fits into arguments found in the civilsociety literature dealing with rentier states.20 That is, government revenues in Jordan had come disproportionately from external rents, primarily government aid. In turn, the regime distributed these rents to key constituencies as patronage, often in the form of subsidies and employment. When the fiscal crisis hit-increasing debt and decreasing revenues-the regime had to rid itself of some of its rentier attributes by decreasing patronage distribution and increasing domestic extraction (i.e., taxes). By relying more on its citizenry than on external rents for its government revenues, Jordan was simultaneously compelled to incorporate a greater public voice in decisionmaking. That voice, in turn, came in the form of a democratic opening.
Such an accounting is true as far as it goes. However, such an explanation needs to be tempered by the insights provided by the concept of defensive democratization. For example, the political liberalization that was initiated in 1989 has been a topdown process designed to maintain basic power relations in Jordan, not to significantly change them. Both the rentier (or, in this case, "post-rentier") and civil-society literatures suggest that regimes in crisis are compelled to liberalize in the face of domestic pressure, and that the liberalization process cannot be easily managed by such weakened regimes. In the case of Jordan, however, the democratization program has been directed from the beginning by the regime, and should be seen as a means of strengthening the regime's position in society, not as an example of the regime yielding to domestic forces.
Moreover, while there were clearly pressures from below for change, there was no significant grass-roots movement for democracy, per se. The riots were primarily about higher prices for basic commodities, not the right to vote. To the degree that there were political messages included in this bottom-up pressure, those messages were about ending corruption and about renewing the special relationship between the Hashemite monarchy and the East Bank/Bedouin communities, a relationship that was perceived to be weakening. Structural adjustment has been seen by East Bankers as primarily benefiting Palestinians, who dominate the private sector, at the expense of East Bankers, who are found disproportionately in the public sector. The suddenness of the decision to hold elections after such a long interregnum, the brief duration of the permitted campaign period, and the prohibition of political parties greatly benefited previously organized groups. As a result, candidates associated with the long-standing Muslim Brotherhood and those representing tribal groups were particularly successful. Twenty of the twenty-six candidates that the Muslim Brotherhood (unofficially) ran won office. In addition, twelve independent Islamist candidates likewise won seats.23 Thus, of sixty-eight realistically potential seats, Islamist candidates won thirty-two, or nearly half. Various tribal representatives and centrists won thirty-five seats, and leftists took the remaining thirteen seats.
Even though an Islamic bloc won a plurality of the seats, it spent most of its fouryear term outside of government. Over the objections of the Islamists, the first session of parliament elected the centrist Sulayman 'Arar as speaker. A coalition of centrists, traditional conservatives, and leftists banded together to shut out the Muslim Brotherhood candidate. Again over the objections of the Muslim Brotherhood, the king appointed Mudar Badran, former head of general intelligence, as prime minister. While Badran negotiated with the Muslim Brotherhood over possible appointments, no deal was struck, although three independent Islamists were included in the cabinet.
The second session was only slightly more successful for the Islamists, who had by then organized more formally in Parliament as the National Islamic Bloc. Parliament opened in November 1990 in the shadow of the Gulf War, and the Islamists were able to elect a speaker from the Muslim Brotherhood, the American-educated CAbd al-Latif 'Arabiyat. In a cabinet shuffle, Badran included four Muslim Brotherhood deputies, splitting the Islamists. The great appeal for the Islamists in joining Badran's cabinet was the promise of the Ministry of Education portfolio. Not long after joining the government, the Brotherhood declared that it would segregate the sexes in all schools. In response, the king dissolved the government. In fact, while there were numerous and significant political and legal developments during the 1989-93 period, the monarchy and the government were largely responsible for them, not the Parliament. Perhaps Parliament's most important early job was to give its blessing to the IMF structural-adjustment program-an ironic task, given that the austerity measures had caused the 1989 riots that had brought Parliament into being. The other legislative achievements during this period-the Political Parties Law, the Press and Publications Law, and the successful push for the lifting of martial law-could not have occurred without the support of the monarchy. In other words, the Parliament could act only within the political parameters set by the king and enforced by his chosen prime minister. Any moves beyond those parameters, especially those which could threaten elite privilege, were quickly quashed. Parliament had little real power to substantially change policies or course. In the end, Parliament's primary task was to legitimate King Hussein's political agenda.
The National Charter (al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urdunni)
In the wake of the events of 1989-the riots and the subsequent sudden resumption of parliamentary life-King Hussein appointed a sixty-member commission to draft a charter outlining the goals and parameters of Jordan's democratization efforts. It is ironic that the governing document for Jordan's democratization was drafted a year after the first post-riots Parliament (and eleventh overall) had been elected and seated. The National Charter was submitted in December 1990 and was subsequently endorsed by the king in June 1991.
The charter itself is interesting on several grounds. First, it is a remarkably progressive document, repeatedly emphasizing democratic rights, intellectual pluralism, tolerance, and equality. In several places, in fact, it stresses equal rights and equality before the law of men and women. Second, it explicitly affirms private-property rights, a major pillar of elite power. Third, it shows a healthy schizophrenia, seeking legitimacy for its principles at various levels: particularist nationalism (i.e., Jordanian nationalism, or wataniyya), Arab nationalism (qawmiyya), Islam (as both religion and civilization), and international or universal standards. Fourth, while the short history it gives of Jordan is understandably self-serving, it is remarkably frank in its admission that the public had lost confidence in state institutions. The charter also accurately notes the non-fulfillment of Gulf states' financial pledges to Jordan, which worsened the fiscal crisis.
What The Press and Publications Law has also been central to the liberalization process, although not always for the right reasons. Jordan's press had become significantly more open after the adoption of the National Charter, which had called for freedom of the press. Early drafts of the law embodied those freedoms and reflected the growing reality of a free press in Jordan. However, against the recommendation of its own legal committee, the conservative Parliament-dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood and tribal elements-adopted Article 40 of the Press and Publications Law, in effect gutting the very press freedoms the law was supposed to guarantee. It made illegal any news items that offends the king or the royal family; insults Arab, Islamic or "friendly" heads of state, or accredited diplomats in Jordan; is contrary to public morals; may offend the dignity of any individual or damage his reputation, or offends the armed forces or security organs. Moreover, any foreign publication that violated any of these (and other) provisions would similarly be banned from entering Jordan. More recently, the government has sought to restrict the press by requiring significant financial resources for any paper to operate, effectively eliminating all small newspapers.
Among the remaining large newspapers, there remained a second, more subtle form of censorship in Jordan. Through shares owned by the Social Security Fund and Jordanian Investment Company, the government owned 60 percent of al-RdCi, 35 percent of al-Dustiir, and 75 percent of Sawt al-Shacb, by far the largest newspapers in Jordan.26 Thus, the government still had the controlling interest on the boards of directors, which can dismiss and appoint new editors. The subsequent pressure on editors to practice self-censorship in order to stay within defined parameters in their reporting was obvious, and was not particularly conducive to a genuinely free press. As one editor said, he had "to know how to play the balancing game."27 Government influence could clearly be seen in the plethora of positive news stories surrounding the peace negotiations with Israel in 1994 (an event not enthusiastically welcomed by most Jordanians) and the virtual absence of negative stories.28
Perhaps the most notable case in which Article 40 provisions were used to intimidate the press was the trial of George Hawatmeh, the editor of the English-language Jordan Times, and one of his reporters. Reporting on the Mu'ta trials of military cadets charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government and assassinate the king, the Jordan Times quoted a defendant who claimed he had been tortured in prison. The Jordan Times had carried quotes from the prosecutor for months, without incident. However, quoting a defendant who claimed-accurately, according to a number of other sources-to have been tortured propelled the government to take Hawatmeh and his writer to court, with a six-month prison term awaiting them if found guilty of "offending the security services."29 While this type of activity chills press freedom, it was a clear improvement on the earlier situation. In the past, the government could have shut down the Times without explanation; now, it had to prove its case in court.
What was perhaps more interesting than the continued restrictions on the press was the easy accommodation many editors made with those restrictions. Where one would perhaps expect such editors to be pushing the limits of the press freedoms, some in fact were quick to defend the restrictions. For example, the editor of al-Dustuir, Musa Kilani, described the press as going though a "teething stage" where the press was getting used to its new role and the government was getting used to the press. He rejected the notion that the monarchy was a legitimate target of criticism, saying only "the government and some of its policies" were fair targets.30 Similarly, Usama al-Sharif, editor of the weekly Star, accepted that Jordan could not afford "Western press standards" because of its social divisions. Such reporting might "create a civil war the next day." Continuing the life-cycle metaphor used by Kilani, Sharif suggested that the Jordanian press was not "developed enough to handle" real freedom.31 One could interpret the press's timidity as many Jordanians did: that press freedom was new and needed to be nurtured, and that over time the press would grow into the role it must play in any democracy. One can also accept the political fragility of the Jordanian polity. This is, after all, a country which had a violent civil war in 1970-71, and those divisions-always present-may well politicize again with the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The skirmishes over the press, however, seemed to be located entirely among Jordan's elite. Indeed, there has been no obvious grass-roots movement for a free press. Within this elite there have been clear differences of opinion as to what role the press should play during the liberalization period. However, there has been elite consensus both inside and outside the press that the media should not play an antagonistic role vis-a-vis the monarchy and the dominant power relations in Jordan.
The 1993 Elections
Although the Parliament elected in 1989 had little power to effect change in Jordan, its large contingent of opposition figures, primarily from the Muslim Brotherhood, acted as a relatively vocal watchdog of government policy. Given the rapid developments in 1993 in the Arab-Israeli talks and the remaining features of the IMF austerity package still to be implemented, even this level of opposition was viewed as detrimental by the government. As a result, the monarchy and the government initiated a process through which a more friendly 12th Parliament would be elected in the November 1993 elections. Their actions were largely successful, as the results of the elections demonstrated.
The single most important step in the attempt to engineer a more docile Parliament was the adoption of the "one-person, one-vote" system. In the prior election, each citizen could vote for as many candidates as there were seats in the electoral district. Since districts ranged in size from two to nine seats, each voter in Jordan had between two and nine votes to distribute among candidates in that district. It was widely believed that the impact of this system in the 1989 elections was the election of more "ideological" candidates-Islamists and leftists-as people could cast their "first" vote for a clan member and then cast their "second" vote on ideological grounds. Thus, each voter could satisfy both familial and ideological impulses. Making voters choose between these was rightly seen by the government to favor tribal gatherings at the expense of political parties.
Compounding the change in the electoral law was the retention of the twenty electoral districts. The districts system already was widely seen to favor southern and central tribal areas at the expense of far more densely populated (and Palestinian) areas, particularly the Amman-Zarqa region. As the secretary-general of the Islamic Action Front, Ishaq al-Farhan, argued, the new hybrid system meant voters would have unequal votes: in districts electing nine representatives, a voter effectively had one-ninth of a vote, while in districts electing two members of parliament, each voter had half of a vote; the "weight" of the vote given the second voter would be four and a half times that of the first voter.32 Even those in government widely acknowledge that the change was principally aimed at undercutting the Muslim Brotherhood.33
As talk of the impending electoral change mounted in the summer of 1993, the Islamic Action Front began voicing its strong opposition, as did other parties. Of the twenty newly registered political parties, sixteen came out against a one-person, onevote system if implemented without concomitant changes in the electoral districts. On 4 August, however, the king dissolved Parliament while scheduling the next election on 8 November. Thirteen days later, the government announced its decision to adopt the one-person electoral change without any changes in districting. The immediate and vocal opposition to this change, including calls for boycotting the election, was quickly stunted by the king's forceful acceptance of the electoral changes. No party, not least the Muslim Brotherhood, wanted to take on the monarchy. By 28 August, the IAF announced it would participate in the election. All other parties followed suit.
The election itself was put in jeopardy by the Israeli-PLO accords signed on 13 September 1993, followed the next day by the signing of the Jordan-Israel Agenda (which set the stage for the formal peace treaty signed between Jordan and Israel in October 1994). Even the king publicly raised concerns as to whether it was the appropriate time to hold elections. However, the decision to go forward was made at the end of September, giving the parties little more than a month to prepare for the elections.
The government's election-engineering provided the anticipated results-that is, electing what came to be known as the "tribal parliament."34 Islamists lost the most seats, going from thirty-two to twenty-two representatives.35 Of those twenty-two, sixteen were IAF candidates and six were independent Islamists (and two of those were members of the Muslim Brotherhood). No other party won more than five seats. In fact, official party candidates won only thirty-four of the eighty seats, with the rest won by independents. Indeed, party lists constituted only 10 percent of all candidates (55 of the 534). Thirty-six of the fifty-five party candidates came from the IAF. An additional forty-five candidates were party members who ran as independents. Even when these are added to the total, less than 19 percent of the candidates running for Parliament were from political parties. Most of the independents were clan candidates running clearly on familial bases. In all, fifty-six of the eighty parliamentarians were solidly pro-Hashemite, falling under categories of "conservatives" (34), "centrists" (13), and East Bank nationalists (9).36 The left, virtually extinct in Jordan, won only two seats.37
The election itself was not without problems. First, the turnout was once again disappointing, considering this was the first multi-party national election in Jordan in decades: 56 percent of registered voters and 45 percent of eligible voters participated. However, 68 percent of registered voters had collected "voting cards" ahead of time (which are presented at the voting precinct on election day in order to verify voting eligibility). Since voting cards do not have to be collected by the individual voter, they were often picked up by clan members or even candidates themselves as a "service" to their constituents. Presumably only the people whose votes were assured were provided this service. Finally, there were numerous reports of the abuse of the voting mechanism for illiterates. Illiterates orally dictate their votes to a precinct worker, who then marks the ballot. Those people who had sold their votes had to pretend to be illiterate at the voting booth so that they could loudly call out the name of the candidate for whom they were voting.
None of this should suggest that the election was a sham. It was, in fact, relatively free and fair, with abuses not noticeably different from those in many democratic elections elsewhere. What was true was that the voting system was successfully engineered to elect a certain type of Parliament. The one-person, one-vote electoral change; the maintenance of electoral districts which favor central and southern tribal areas; and the voting card system all worked to elect a heavily tribal, pro-Hashemite Parliament. Shubaylat's work did not win him many friends within the overlapping political and economic establishments. Nor did his vocal criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood's "appeasement" of the regime go over well in a number of Islamist circles.42 However, he remained popular at the grass-roots level and also hails from a prominent East Bank family, so could not be easily dismissed by the regime.
By pushing the limits of democratization, Shubaylat was attacking the power structure in Jordan. As long as elections could be suitably manipulated, the press contained within recognized limits, and Parliament held ineffectual by its lack of real power, democratization would not be seen as threatening to elite interests. By exposing and challenging the ways in which business was done by representatives of the political class in Jordan, Shubaylat-and others-threatened to make the democratization process a harbinger of structural change.
As a result, Shubaylat and his fellow deputy Yacqub Qarrash were arrested in August 1992 on trumped-up charges, the most serious of which was attempting to overthrow the government. Various weapons and explosives were said to be found in Shubaylat's possession, and he was accused of being paid by Iran to foment instability in Jordan. The evidence against Shubaylat was almost certainly fabricated, and the charges politically motivated. The trial was held in a military court, a system which does not share the reputation for relative independence that Jordan's civilian judiciary does. The trial engendered a great deal of skepticism over Shubaylat's guilt in Jordan: no real evidence was produced; most witnesses were inmates suspected of making deals for reduced sentences; and the prosecution's star witness immediately renounced his own testimony, saying it had been coerced by Jordan's security personnel.43 Nevertheless, Shubaylat and Qarrash were sentenced to death, which was then immediately commuted to twenty years in prison. Within forty eight hours, the king pardoned the two parliamentarians as part of a general amnesty, provoking further speculation that the trial's outcome had been "planned in advance The earlier co-optation of the Muslim Brotherhood by the regime for the benefit of both gave way during liberalization to a more strained relationship. However, as the earlier examples suggest, the government has been relatively successful in containing the Islamist movement in Jordan through coercion and, more importantly, by shaping both the structure of political participation and the internal dynamics of the movement itself. However, it is less clear that such containment can continue to be effective in the coming years because of the movement's persistent strength and its large Palestinian presence in a period of volatile identity politics. What such potential domestic volatility as a result of the settlement with Israel does suggest, however, is that the limited democratization cannot be deepened without threatening established elite interests.
CAN DEMOCRACY AND PEACE CO-EXIST?
As has been made clear, Jordan's modest steps toward political liberalization were taken in order to limit the possibility of uncontrollable change, and were designed to protect established interests during an uncertain period. The process was undertaken initially by the monarchy as a pre-emptive strike to insure its political survival. In subsequent years, liberalization was expanded only in ways that did not threaten (and often helped along) major economic and political objectives of the regime, especially the IMF-mandated austerity plan due to run to 1999 and the settlement with Israel. Democratization, in effect, has been a continuation of state policies by other means. When democratization has threatened elite privileges, even in a legal manner (e.g., the Shubaylat corruption hearings), non-democratic means have been used to quash those challenges. Perhaps the best measure of the limited nature of Jordan's democratization is that the most powerful groups in Jordan prior to 1989 remain so today: the monarchy and its coterie, the army and security services,50 wealthy business elites, and East Bank tribal leaders.
That is not to suggest that nothing has changed. Democratization has made the press freer and political association easier; most important, it has also diminished the role of the mukhdbardt. The confiscation of passports to silence opposition members has virtually stopped, and passports have been returned. Arbitrary arrest and torture in Jordan-which have always occurred at rates lower than those of its neighborsare now rare. An indigenous Amnesty International office is even in place. Thus, political life in Jordan is the freest it has been since the 1950s. In addition, liberalization has produced greater public participation in the shaping of policy. For example, the revenue-generating aspects of the austerity package were altered through public debate.51 Public resistance to a modest increase in public-school fees in 1994 forced that decision to be put off.52
Nor is the centrality of the protection of elite privilege during democratization a priori problematic. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter note that the maintenance of elite privilege has been the cornerstone of "all previously known transitions to political democracy." For them, measures that threaten elite property rights or military prerogative will likely doom the entire democratic transition.53 Thus, it can be argued that for Jordan's democratization to have any chance of deepening, it must make clear that the interests of dominant elites-civilian and military-will be protected.
Jordan's peace treaty with Israel may well prove to be the undoing of the country's democratization program. The two years that followed the treaty-signing were tumultuous for Jordan, highlighting its increased political vulnerability. Surprised by the level of opposition that the peace treaty generated, the government began to placate key constituencies almost immediately. Custom duties on cars and luxury goods were slashed; salaries for schoolteachers (the largest single group of public employees) increased; and the army and security services were promised new weapons systems and a general modernization of forces (with American help).54 In December 1994, Deputy Prime Minister Thuqan Hindawi resigned, citing "the cabinet's inability to cope with the aftermath of the peace treaty."55 A week later, Ahmad 'Ubaydat, a former prime minister and head of intelligence, was asked to resign from the upper house of Parliament because of his opposition to the terms of the treaty and his outspoken criticism of the Majali government's measures to limit dissent. Tahir al-Masri, another quintessential "establishment" politician, withdrew from his campaign to be re-elected speaker of Parliament due to the turmoil of post-peace Jordanian politics.
In 34One should not view the elections of a number of tribal elements as an example of a victory for "traditional" politics. There is a great deal of anecdotal evidence to suggest that many of the clan dynamics present during this process were very new, including the ways in which members were chosen to run and who participated in the selection of candidates. In short, the process tended to be less hierarchical, less patriarchal, and more fluid and flexible than one would expect of "traditional" clan politics. Thus, it really is better seen as an example of state policies not just tapping into or even re-invigorating but transforming "traditional groups" and their politics. Residents of Salt-who have a reputation of being the most chauvinistic Jordanians-complained bitterly to the king after losing some of "their" seats. As a result, there is a great deal of speculation that electoral districts may be changed to remove Baq'a from the Salt district. Some observers speculate that a special "camps" electoral district may be created. 
